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INTRODUCTION
Meet Kody Brown, an advertising salesman living happily in Utah
with his four wives and 18 children.1 Apart from the fact that Kody has
multiple wives, the Browns are an otherwise normal family. They take
vacations, argue with one another, and share meals together at the end of
a long day. Unfortunately for the Browns, local authorities began
investigating them to determine whether they were in violation of the
state’s criminal bigamy laws.2 Fearing for their safety, Kody moved his
family to Nevada and filed suit against the state, claiming that the
investigation violated his family’s right to privacy. At trial, the lower court
ruled in favor of the Browns and struck down as unconstitutional the
portion of the state’s bigamy statute that criminally implicated Kody for
cohabiting3 with multiple wives.4 The appellate court, however, dismissed
the case and effectively reinstated the statute that criminalized Kody and
his family’s way of life.5
TLC’s popular television series “Sister Wives,” which follows the
Browns’ lives, has entertained millions of viewers over the course of seven
seasons.6 What many viewers may not realize, however, are the legal issues
raised by the show’s plot. The Utah district court’s ruling in favor of the
Browns and striking down of the criminal portion of Utah’s bigamy statute
Copyright 2017, by MCLAURINE H. ZENTNER.
1. The following hypothetical described herein is based on the factual
circumstances in the 2013 Utah state court decision of Brown v. Buhman. See
generally Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2017); Bigamy, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[Bigamy is] [t]he act of marrying one person while
legally married to another.”); see also Polygamy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1347
(defining polygamy as “[t]he state or practice of having more than one spouse
simultaneously”).
3. Cohabitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (“[Cohabitation is] [t]he fact,
state, or condition of living together, esp[ecially] as partners in life, usu[ally] with
the suggestion of sexual relations.”).
4. Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–23.
5. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016). The court
justified its dismissal of the case by concluding that because Utah prosecutors had a
policy of not pursuing most bigamy cases, the plaintiffs had no credible fear of future
prosecution and thus lacked standing. Id. at 1167; see also discussion infra Part II.A.
6. See Michael Rothman, “Sister Wives”: Everything You Need to Know About
Kody Brown and Family, ABC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Enter
tainment/kody-brown-sister-wives/story?id=38331357 (providing background of the
Brown family and discussing the purpose and plot of the show) [https://perma.cc
/HS38-9QVA].

2017]

COMMENT

337

was vacated recently by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on procedural
grounds.7 The Tenth Circuit’s decision, along with the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges prohibiting states from
banning same-sex marriages,8 has intensified a new and controversial debate
concerning the legality of anti-bigamy laws. A central issue debated concerns
whether marriage should be restricted to relationships consisting of only two
individuals, thus denying marriage rights to individuals, such as Kody and
his family, who are in bigamous unions.
Perhaps the most controversial matter surrounding the constitutionality
of bigamous marriage is whether states should recognize the practice legally
and confer governmental benefits to individuals in these unions. A major
concern surrounding the legal recognition of bigamous marriage is the effect
such recognition would have on tax and community property laws—two
areas of law shaped by the concept of marriage as a legal union between two
individuals. A United States Supreme Court decision requiring states to
recognize bigamous marriage as a legal institution would disrupt tax and
community property laws significantly throughout the United States.9 The
issue of bigamous marriage is particularly relevant to Louisiana—not only
because Louisiana is a community property state10 but also because of
Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute.11
Part I of this Comment provides background on the United States
Supreme Court’s recent expansion of individual rights and liberties and
the significant ambiguities surrounding the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part II analyzes Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute and the
issues surrounding the bigamous marriage debate generally. Part III
conducts a constitutional analysis of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute
and highlights the central issues the statute raises. Lastly, Part IV proposes
that the Louisiana Supreme Court, if confronted with the constitutionality
of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute, should decline to extend the
fundamental right to marry to bigamous unions under a rational basis
review. Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court should hold the portion of
the statute criminalizing bigamous marriage unconstitutional in light of
7. Brown, 822 F.3d at 1179; see also discussion infra Part II.A.
8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
9. See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 113, 117 (2013).
10. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (2017). The question of legally recognizing
bigamous marriage presents a significant challenge to community property states that
treat marriage as an institution consisting of only two people. See, e.g., Hadar Aviram
& Gwendolyn Leachman, The Future of Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons from the
Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 269, 318 (2015).
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:76 (2017).
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Lawrence v. Texas12 and the greater privacy rights that Louisiana citizens
enjoy under the state constitution.13
I. BACKGROUND AND PROGRESSION TOWARD THE BIGAMY DEBATE
Marriage is one of the most profound and important institutions in
American society, and many people consider marriage to be the most
significant moment an individual can experience during one’s life.14
Marriage also is a unique institution because of its nationwide recognition
as a contract formed between the spouses and the government.15 The legal
aspect of marriage seems rather peculiar in light of the particularly
intimate and private nature associated with the institution of marriage.
Marriage offers the opportunity for two people to join together in a
single union composed of love, fidelity, and spirituality.16 The government
also benefits from this arrangement because marriage can be an effective
mechanism to facilitate child-rearing in stable family environments—the
building blocks of a strong and productive society.17 The government’s
extensive role in regulating marriage, however, raises the question of how far
regulations should extend when individual rights and liberties are concerned.
An examination of the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
individual rights and liberties and the extent to which they are protected by
the United States Constitution highlights the significance concerning the issue
of governmental regulation of bigamous relationships.
12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13. LA CONST. art. I, § 5; see also S. Con. Res. 39, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La.
1997). Former Supreme Court Justice Byron White famously stated, “The
[Supreme] Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194
(1986). It is with this idea in mind that this Comment approaches its analysis of
bigamous marriage.
14. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“The centrality
of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has
existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has
transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together.”).
15. See EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX, MARRIAGE: HUMAN REALITY AND SAVING
MYSTERY 388 (1965) (explaining that the contractual nature of marriage came from
the Roman consensus idea of marriage).
16. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than
marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and
family.”).
17. See id. at 2600; see also, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400
(1923).
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A. Introduction to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is one
of the most significant constitutional amendments because it safeguards
fundamental individual rights and mandates equal protection of the laws.18
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment contains both the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.19 The Due Process Clause
declares that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”20 Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause
mandates that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”21 Together, these two clauses form one of
the most heavily litigated sections of the United States Constitution.22 The
high volume of litigation is primarily a result of the Supreme Court’s
ambiguous interpretation of the overlap between these two clauses.23
The United States Supreme Court has relied on the Due Process Clause
to recognize independent substantive and procedural requirements that state
laws must observe.24 The Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause
often concerns the “fundamental rights” of individuals that the Court deems
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”25 When deciding whether a right
is “fundamental,” the Court examines whether the right is “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.”26 If a court deems the right fundamental,
then it applies “strict scrutiny” analysis under which the government must

18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
19. Id. § 1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reservoir of
Congressional Power?, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 854 (1933).
23. See discussion infra Part I.B.
24. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
569 (5th ed. 2015).
25. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
26. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines
but rather from careful ‘respect for the teachings of history (and), solid recognition of
the basic values that underlie our society.’”). This analysis by the Court primarily
concerns rights not mentioned expressly in the text of the Constitution, unlike other
fundamental rights, such as the right to trial by jury and the Fourth Amendment’s
safeguard from unreasonable searches and seizures. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
24, at 826.
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demonstrate a compelling state interest27 that is advanced by a narrowly
tailored law that infringes upon the right at issue.28 Strict scrutiny analysis
is the most stringent judicial standard of review and ordinarily results in a
court striking down the law in question.29 If a court determines that the law
under review does not implicate or infringe upon a fundamental right, then
“rational basis” review applies, which requires the government to show only
that the law in question rationally relates to some legitimate state interest.30
Comparatively, the rational basis test is the least stringent standard of review
and ordinarily results in the court upholding the law.31
Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause largely in response to widespread discrimination against former
slaves after the Civil War.32 The Equal Protection Clause mandates that all
persons in similar capacities be treated equally under the law.33 In an equal
protection analysis, courts focus on whether a sufficient governmental
interest exists to justify the discriminatory effect of the law at issue on a
certain class of people.34 The two primary ways in which a law can be held
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause is if the court finds that the

27. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (“Under
strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State's asserted purpose must
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”).
28. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 567.
30. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
31. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 565–66. An additional level of
scrutiny that courts sometimes apply is the middle tier of review known as
“intermediate scrutiny.” Id. Under this standard of review, which is slightly more
stringent than rational basis but slightly less stringent than strict scrutiny, a law will be
upheld as long as it is substantially related to an important governmental purpose. See
id.; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983). Although intermediate
scrutiny is applied in various contexts, such as laws involving gender discrimination
and regulation of commercial speech, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), rational basis and strict scrutiny
are the only levels of scrutiny at issue in this Comment.
32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 695.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942). Additionally, the
levels of scrutiny that apply to an analysis under due process also apply to an
analysis under equal protection. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 567.

2017]

COMMENT

341

law in question implicates a “suspect class,”35 such as race,36 or if the law
discriminates against a non-suspect class but nevertheless burdens a
fundamental right.37 The latter scenario, which implicates the overlap of both
due process and equal protection, marks the point when an analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment becomes especially complex due to the Court’s
failure in recent decisions to specify the appropriate levels of scrutiny for
analyzing individual rights.38
B. A Clausal Collision: The Ambiguities in Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence
American society has defied social injustice throughout its history and its
legal regime has evolved, albeit gradually, to incorporate new rights and
freedoms for all its citizens.39 In the past 50 years alone, the United States
Supreme Court has facilitated a significant expansion of social liberties,
especially within the realm of individual rights and liberties.40 Today, United
States citizens have the constitutional rights to privacy and to marry any
individual, regardless of race, social status, or sexual orientation.41 The
expansion of social liberties is especially significant in relation to bigamous
marriage because the expansion highlights the two interrelated constitutional
issues central to this debate: the right to privacy and the right to marry.
1. The Right to Privacy
Although the United States Constitution does not provide explicitly
for a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has affirmed repeatedly an
individual right to freedom from unwarranted intrusion or exposure in

35. In determining whether a class warrants a heightened standard of scrutiny
under the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court considers history of
discrimination, political powerlessness, immutability of the characteristic, and the
relation between the characteristic and the ability of the group to perform or
contribute to society. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973).
36. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 698.
37. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
38. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 822.
39. See, e.g., id. at 695–96.
40. See, e.g., id.
41. See, e.g., id. at 696. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

342

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

one’s private and intimate affairs.42 In particular, the Court has analyzed
this right frequently in the context of marriage.43
In 1965, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut invalidated a
law that criminalized the use of contraceptives as violating the marital
“right to privacy,”44 finding the right protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
the Court held a Massachusetts state law unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause for preventing unmarried
couples from accessing contraceptives.46 The Court reasoned that the law
resulted in impermissible discrimination by denying the right to possess
contraceptives to unmarried couples.47
In 2003, the Court promulgated the momentous decision of Lawrence
v. Texas, a case that involved a controversial Texas criminal law that
classified consensual homosexual intercourse as illegal sodomy.48 The
case arose after Texas police arrested two men for engaging in sexual
intercourse and later fined them under a Texas criminal law that prohibited
“deviant sexual intercourse”—defined under the law as sexual activity
between same-sex individuals.49 The Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional and held that an individual has a right to engage in
intimate and consensual sexual conduct under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.50 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia heavily
criticized Justice Kennedy’s holding in the majority opinion as ambiguous
for failing to articulate the applicable level of scrutiny.51 Furthermore, the
Court did not define the right to privacy as “fundamental” or mention strict
scrutiny in the opinion.52 Although the holding in Lawrence concerned a

42. Right of privacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. Id. at 485–86 (emphasizing that the idea of allowing police “to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives . . .
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”).
45. See id. at 485.
46. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
47. Id. at 452.
48. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
49. Id. at 563.
50. Id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.”).
51. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 882.
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statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy,53 many scholars believe that
the broader impact of this decision was the Court’s implied recognition of
a “fundamental right to privacy.”54 The Lawrence decision set the stage
for later Supreme Court decisions that would expand individual civil
liberties further, particularly the right to marry.55
2. The Right to Marry
Although marriage is not defined in the United States Constitution, the
judicial understanding of this institution has evolved throughout the
nation’s history.56 The Supreme Court first recognized marriage as a
fundamental right in the groundbreaking decision of Loving v. Virginia.57
In Loving, the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited
a white person from marrying another person of a different race.58 The
first part of the Court’s opinion explained why the law violated the Equal
Protection Clause, stating that “[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”59 The Court held that the
law deprived the Lovings, the interracial couple prosecuted in Virginia for
violating its anti-miscegenation law, of their constitutionally protected
liberty without due process of law.60
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that
prevented noncustodial parents, if they were required to pay child support
to a minor not in their custody, from marrying without first obtaining
permission from a court.61 Although the Court accepted the state’s claim
that it had a substantial interest in ensuring that noncustodial parents paid
child support, the Court concluded that the law was not related sufficiently

53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 881; see also Casey E. Faucon, Polygamy
after Windsor: What’s Religion Got to Do with It?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471,
499–500 (2015) (“[T]he Lawrence decision expanded upon the scope of Due Process
to include sexual conduct beyond the marital relationship, allowing the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions.”).
55. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also discussion infra Part I.B.2.
56. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613–16 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (discussing the
aspects of marriage that have changed over time).
57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967).
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
61. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978).
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to that end.62 Thus, the Court held that the law violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it impermissibly interfered with the right to marry.63
In United States v. Windsor, the Court struck down as unconstitutional
a portion of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) for denying
equal protection to homosexual individuals.64 Under DOMA, federal law
defined marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman.65 The
Court emphasized that there was “no legitimate purpose” served by the federal
government’s refusal to recognize marriages that a state acknowledged under
its laws.66 In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy declared DOMA
unconstitutional but, again, failed to specify which level of scrutiny
applied67 and did not address whether the law impermissibly infringed
upon the fundamental right to marry.68
It was not until 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges that the Court recognized
that the fundamental right to marry applied equally to same-sex couples.69
In Obergefell, the Court declined to frame the purported right at issue as
whether a fundamental right to same-sex marriage existed.70 Instead, the
Court asked the broader question of whether the fundamental right to

62. Id. at 390–91. The Court determined that because the law at issue triggered
a “strict scrutiny” analysis for interfering with the exercise of the fundamental right
to marry, the state not only was required to show a sufficiently important state
interest justifying the law but also that the law was tailored closely to meet that
interest. Id. at 388. Thus, although the state satisfied its first burden under a strict
scrutiny analysis in proffering a sufficient state interest, it failed to show that the
law was sufficiently tailored to meet that interest. Id. at 390–91.
63. Id. at 388.
64. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
65. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675.
66. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
67. See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. See id.
69. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). An important
caveat that the Court made clear in its opinion in Obergefell was that its holding
was not intended to interfere with the fundamental rights protected under the First
Amendment. Id. at 2607. In other words, only the states are bound by the ruling
in Obergefell, rather than religious organizations and persons who oppose samesex marriage because of their beliefs, whether religiously motivated or not. Id.
(“The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so
central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the
family structure they have long revered.”).
70. Id. at 2602.
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marry also applied to same-sex couples.71 Thus, Obergefell is significant for
recognizing the legality of same-sex marriages and for the Court’s ambiguous
opinion that confused the doctrines of due process and equal protection
without explaining how each doctrine applied to the facts at hand.72
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy declined to follow the traditional
fundamental rights analysis ordinarily applied by the Court, choosing instead
to list four distinct reasons as to why the fundamental right to marry also
applies to same-sex couples.73 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
criticized Justice Kennedy’s “test” for contradicting the fundamental rights
analysis used by the Court in prior decisions.74 Under the traditional
fundamental rights analysis, the Court asks whether the purported right at
issue is “fundamental to this Nation’s history and tradition of ordered
liberty.”75 In the majority opinion, however, Justice Kennedy explained that
marriage is fundamental to society under the Constitution because it: (1) “is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”; (2) “supports a two-person
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals”; (3)
“safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related
rights of childrearing, procreation, and education”; and (4) “is a keystone of
our social order.”76 Justice Kennedy concluded that these core functions of
marriage equally applied to same-sex couples; in other words, same-sex
couples, like heterosexual couples, were “similarly situated” in regards to
the fundamental right of marriage.77 Justice Kennedy’s inability to adhere
to the traditional fundamental rights analysis marked the point when he
essentially combined the doctrines of due process and equal protection;
although Justice Kennedy raised due process concerns by focusing on the
right to marry, he posed the question of his analysis through an equal
protection framework.78
71. Id. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority for this broad
framing of the right at issue, arguing that “[o]ur precedents have accordingly insisted
that judges ‘exercise the utmost care’ in identifying implied fundamental rights, ‘lest
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy
preferences of the Members of this Court.’” Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting)
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
72. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
73. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589–90.
74. Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
75. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 672.
76. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–601.
77. Id. at 2599.
78. See generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Obergefell v. Hodges: Framing
Fundamental Rights, SSRN (June 29, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2624725
[https://perma.cc/5D7E-SPBV].
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The muddled overlap between the Fourteenth Amendment doctrines
of due process and equal protection is the consequence of vague reasoning
rendered by the Court in the last few decades.79 The ambiguity of the
Supreme Court’s opinions regarding the Fourteenth Amendment doctrines
has been exacerbated by the Court’s recent opinions that fail to articulate
the levels of scrutiny used when analyzing purported rights and liberties.80
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM OF PLURAL UNIONS
This section first provides context to the United States Supreme
Court’s initial interpretation of the practice of bigamy in addition to recent
interpretations by the lower courts. Second, this section conducts a cursory
analysis of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute to highlight the two
primary issues addressed in this Comment: whether the government has a
constitutional basis for criminally charging individuals in bigamous
unions and whether the government can decline to grant legal recognition
to those unions. Lastly, this section addresses the potential ramifications
of legally recognizing bigamous marriage, particularly in terms of its
potential impact on Louisiana’s matrimonial regime.
A. Bigamy and Reynolds v. United States
Because the recent United States Supreme Court decisions expand
upon the right to privacy and the right to marry,81 an important debate has
emerged regarding how these decisions should impact bigamous unions.
Bigamy is a practice that has remained illegal in all 50 states since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. United States,82 which has yet to
be overruled.83 In Reynolds, the Court upheld the validity of laws banning
bigamy under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.84 The
Court justified its decision to ban bigamous marriages by articulating that,
79. See discussion supra Part I.B.
80. See discussion supra Part I.B.
81. See discussion supra Part I.B.
82. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
83. See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742 (Utah 2006) (arguing that Reynolds
remains valid precedent because the courts have continued to cite to it with
approval in modern Free Exercise cases).
84. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 149. The Court previously has elaborated on the
distinction between religious beliefs and religiously motivated conduct, stating that
the Free Exercise Clause “embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
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although religious beliefs are protected from governmental interference, the
same conclusion is not true for religious practices that harm the public order of
society.85
A recent decision by a federal district court in Utah, however, addressed the
constitutionality of Utah’s criminal bigamy statute.86 Rather than confront
whether states can deny legal recognition to bigamous unions as a form of
marriage, the court instead held the statute unconstitutional for criminalizing
cohabitation, a private activity the court deemed protected under the Due
Process Clause.87 The Tenth Circuit, however, recently vacated the district
court’s decision on procedural grounds without a discussion of the merits,88
further intensifying the debate surrounding this controversial issue. Adding fuel
to this debate is the constitutional uncertainty of Louisiana’s bigamy statute,
which contains similar elements as the Utah statute that was struck down
initially in the Buhman decision.89
B. The Problem with Louisiana’s Criminal Bigamy Statute
Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute defines bigamy as “the marriage to
another person by a person already married, and having a husband or wife
living, or the habitual cohabitation, in [Louisiana], with such second husband
or wife, regardless of the place where the marriage was celebrated.”90 This
statute, though similar to Utah’s bigamy statute, is distinguishable because the
Utah statute defines bigamy as the act of “purporting91 to marry” and
cohabiting with another person when one of the parties is currently married.92
Despite containing similar “cohabitation” language, the Louisiana statute is
narrower in scope because it applies only to individuals who marry another
person while in an existing marriage.93 Nevertheless, the Louisiana statute
does not discriminate as to the location of where the marriage was
performed;94 therefore, individuals who have more than one spouse and move
to Louisiana from another state or country are susceptible to criminal liability
under this statute. Thus, the two main questions for this analysis are whether
85. See generally Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
86. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
87. See id. at 1202; see also supra note 2.
88. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016); see also supra note 5.
89. See discussion infra Part II.B.
90. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:76 (2017).
91. Purport, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that to
purport is to “profess or claim, esp[ecially] falsely”).
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2017).
93. See § 14:76.
94. Id.
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the government may criminalize the practice of bigamy and, if not, then
whether bigamous unions also should be recognized as a legal form of
marriage.
Although the broader issue confronted in this Comment concerns the
constitutionality of laws denying legal recognition to bigamous unions, the
criminal nature of bigamy laws, like Louisiana’s bigamy statute, is crucial
to address in light of the Lawrence decision.95 Laws criminalizing bigamy
raise serious concerns not only because of the constitutional uncertainty of
the laws but also because they present the opportunity for state authorities
to target minorities or other groups of individuals in a potentially
unconstitutional way.96
The Louisiana Supreme Court, if given the opportunity, should
address the constitutionality of both the criminal nature of Louisiana’s
bigamy statute and the broader issue of whether it is constitutional for
Louisiana to continue denying legal recognition to these unions. When a
court decides a case without discussing the merits at issue, as the Tenth
Circuit did in the Buhman decision,97 it creates a muddled precedent for
other courts to follow and leaves individuals uncertain as to the full scope
of their rights as law-abiding citizens.
C. The Question and Implications of Legalizing Bigamous Unions
The constitutional question of legalizing bigamous unions has two farreaching implications. First, the bigamous marriage debate highlights the
complex ambiguity that plagues current Supreme Court jurisprudence
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and the uncertain future of due
process and equal protection.98 Furthermore, this debate raises the issue of
how bigamous unions can be incorporated into the current American legal
system.
95. Samantha Slark, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement
on the Liberty Interests of Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 456 (2004).
96. See, e.g., Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana House Votes 27-67 to Keep
Unconstitutional Anti-Sodomy Law on the Books, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/post_558.html [https://perma.cc/NV
R8-32S4]; Aaron Looney, Deputies arrest man for bigamy, LIVINGSTON PARISH
NEWS (May 30, 2004), http://www.livingstonparishnews.com/news/deputies-arrestman-for-bigamy/article_b0317bd4-7676-59fd-8db3-856f1d116b65.html [https://per
ma.cc /6L98-57VG]; see generally Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy:
Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955
(2010).
97. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
98. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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1. Uncertainty After Obergefell
Regarding the constitutional question of bigamous unions, several legal
scholars have proposed various ways in which the legal right to bigamy can
fit within a constitutional framework.99 Much of the legal scholarship
concerning this issue, however, remains uncertain as to how the legalization
of bigamy could be achieved or whether such a framework exists at all. Some
scholars suggest that bigamous unions can obtain legal recognition under due
process100 while others believe that equal protection, especially after Windsor,
provides the clearest path.101 Finally, the Obergefell decision suggests that the
legal recognition of bigamy may be achieved through a combination of both
due process and equal protection reasoning.102 These various proposals
emphasize the ambiguity plaguing this constitutional debate.
Obergefell is not the only vague Supreme Court decision that has
interpreted the scope of individual rights; the Lawrence and Windsor
holdings also declined to specify a scrutiny standard.103 The Lawrence and
Windsor decisions, however, primarily addressed the right at issue under

99. See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 309; Faucon, supra note
54, at 476.
100. Cassiah M. Ward, I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives: Lawrence v.
Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Modern America, 11 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 131, 142 (2004) (suggesting that advocates of plural marriage might
argue that a due process right to engage in this practice resulted from the right to
sexual privacy created in Lawrence); Michael G. Myers, Polygamist Eye for the
Monogamist Guy: Homosexual Sodomy...Gay Marriage...Is Polygamy Next?, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 1451, 1471–74 (2006). But see Hema Chatlani, In Defense of
Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward
the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101, 128–32 (2006) (arguing that
polygamy differs too much in structure and content from same-sex marriage to support
any colorable legal analogy).
101. See, e.g., Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for
a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 2021–24 (2015);
see also Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 309 (arguing that a sexual
orientation classification could trigger a strict scrutiny standard or a heightened
standard of scrutiny).
102. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“These considerations
lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty
of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right
and that liberty.”) (emphasis added); see also discussion infra Part III.A.2.
103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013).
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either due process or equal protection grounds—but not both.104 In
Obergefell, on the other hand, the Court combined the two doctrines without
explaining its analysis under either of the two clauses.105
2. The Potential Impact of Legalizing Bigamous Unions
In addition to the significant ambiguities regarding the constitutionality
of bigamous marriage, another concern is how the practice can be
incorporated into the current American legal system. The major issue with
this proposal concerns the potential effect that legalizing bigamous marriage
would have on areas of law that regard marriage as a relationship between
two individuals.106 Specifically, this Comment focuses on the potential
impact bigamous marriage would have on tax and community property law.
United States tax law likely would be affected most by the legalization
of bigamous marriage because of the federal joint-filing income tax system
that distinguishes between married and unmarried couples for tax rate
purposes.107 Because United States tax law is already wrought with
complexity,108 it is alarming that this potential issue largely has been
ignored by scholars in the bigamous marriage debate.109 The United States
Internal Revenue Code in its current form is wholly ill-equipped to
incorporate bigamous marriage unless the law undergoes significant and
necessary revisions.110
The incorporation of bigamous marriage into the American legal system
also will impact community property laws significantly. Although there are
only nine community property states,111 the number includes Texas and

104. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government.”) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 at 2680 (“DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of
persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment.”) (emphasis added).
105. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05; see also discussion infra Part III.A.2.
106. See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 318.
107. 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (2012); see, e.g., id.
108. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 9, at 125 (citing Samuel A. Donaldson, The
Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 682–83 (2003)).
109. See, e.g., id. at 115 (“[A]side from a glancing mention of tax evasion, no
scholarship has analyzed the tax environment polygamists face.”).
110. Id. at 168.
111. Diane J. Klein, Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 33, 72 (2010).
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California, two of the most heavily populated states in the country.112 Thus,
the legalization of bigamous unions potentially would impact a large number
of citizens in the United States. Unlike the states that adopted the common
law marriage regime, community property states recognize that the assets
obtained after the marriage has come into existence are owned equally by the
spouses.113 The legalization of bigamous marriage would have serious
implications for community property law because, similar to United States tax
law, community property law treats marriage as a union between two
individuals.114 Allowing marriage to be a union between more than two
people significantly complicates the structural bounds of community property
law115 because it is unclear how the rules governing divorce and the division
of marital assets would apply to relationships unlimited in number or form.
III. DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF MARRIAGE
This Comment performs a constitutional analysis of bigamous unions
to determine the proper level of scrutiny that should apply if a court were
to address this issue. Additionally, this analysis will determine if a
sufficient governmental interest in criminalizing and declining recognition
to these unions exists.
A. Defining the Proper Scrutiny Standard
To consider fully the constitutional implications of Louisiana’s
criminal bigamy statute, Louisiana courts must determine the proper level
of scrutiny that should apply when analyzing two central questions. The
first issue raised by Louisiana’s bigamy statute is whether the state

112. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION OF THE 50 STATES, THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND PUERTO RICO (2000), https://www.census.gov/pop
ulation/www/cen2000/maps/respop.html [https://perma.cc/AF5H-KP6E].
113. See, e.g., Caroline B. Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of
the Community Property System, Why California Adopted It, and Why Community
Property Principles Benefit Women, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS
1, 6–7 (2011) (“[C]ommunity property is not something that spouses voluntarily
agree to by contract. Instead, this civil law system of marital property law
automatically springs into being when a couple gets married.”); see also Paul Due,
Origin and Historical Development of the Community Property System, 25 LA. L.
REV. 78, 78 (1964).
114. Davis, supra note 96, at 1990.
115. Relatedly, the legalization of bigamous marriage potentially will impact
the rules of inheritance laws and their effects upon the termination of marriage.
See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 275.
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constitution prohibits the government from imposing criminal penalties on
individuals engaged in the practice of bigamy. If it is unconstitutional for
the government to criminalize bigamy, the second issue is whether the
government can continue to deny legal recognition to this practice.
1. The Level of Scrutiny for Criminalizing Bigamous Unions
The Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas offers the most
helpful guidance for a constitutional analysis of laws criminalizing
bigamous unions because of the broad privacy interests articulated by the
Court in its finding of a fundamental right to privacy.116 Furthermore, the
Court seemed to suggest that it no longer would uphold laws that rely on
moral reasons for their justification;117 thus, the Lawrence decision
potentially marks the end of any legislation “restricting liberties solely based
on a majoritarian perception of morality.”118 The Lawrence court, however,
reached a narrow holding on the constitutionality of legislation prohibiting
homosexual sodomy.119 Nevertheless, Lawrence should require the
decriminalization of bigamy because the decision supports the notion that
the right to privacy protects the personal and intimate relations of
individuals from governmental intrusion.120
Justice Kennedy’s rationale in Lawrence raises an important question:
is the right to privacy broad enough to include the right of individuals to
practice bigamy without the fear of criminal punishment? 121 Although the
opinion was relatively ambiguous regarding the level of scrutiny applied in its
analysis,122 the Lawrence decision did more than invalidate laws prohibiting
homosexual sodomy; the decision set forth a powerful affirmation by the
Supreme Court of a right to privacy under the Constitution.123 Moreover,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence emphasized that the Court has
116. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
117. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V.
TEXAS (Norton 2012); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
118. Faucon, supra note 54, at 499.
119. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
120. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 788.
121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
122. See id. at 578; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 882 (“Nowhere did
the Court [in Lawrence] speak of a fundamental right or mention strict scrutiny. On the
other hand, the Court did rely on privacy cases where strict scrutiny had been used.”).
123. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65.
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safeguarded privacy for almost a century in decisions involving family
autonomy, contraception, and abortion.124 Nowhere in the opinion, however,
did Justice Kennedy explain the level of scrutiny applied in his analysis.125
Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest that the statute infringed a fundamental
right but only used the language “legitimate basis,”126 implying that he
applied a rational basis standard.127 After Lawrence, however, laws justified
on moralistic grounds that prohibit private and intimate activity likely will fail
to pass a judicial analysis under the rational basis test.
Lawrence v. Texas is an important decision in the context of laws
criminalizing bigamy because of the similarities between bigamy and the
intimate activity protected by the Lawrence Court’s holding.128 For the
same reasons that marriage and sexual activity are related, bigamy and sexual
activity are related in ways as well, despite being separate concepts, because
they are both private activities that benefit the parties involved. What becomes
crucial in applying the rationale in Lawrence to the practice of bigamy is how
the purported “right” is framed.129 In Lawrence, the majority opinion declined
to frame the intimate activity as a “right to homosexual sodomy.”130 Instead,
124. Id. at 564–66 (first citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
then citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and then citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
125. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 879. Many scholars have noted the
absence of any discussion in Lawrence regarding the levels of scrutiny traditionally
applied by the Court in a constitutional analysis. See Eric Berger, Lawrence’s
Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 765, 782 (2013) (“It is therefore especially striking that Lawrence, a
case about both liberty and equality, declined to identify a tier of scrutiny at all.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 46 (2003) (explaining that much of the opacity
in Lawrence stems from the Court’s failure to identify a level of scrutiny).
126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
127. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 882. In Romer v. Evans, a precursory
decision to Lawrence, the Supreme Court was confronted with a Colorado initiative
that had the effect of encouraging discrimination against homosexual individuals.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
held that because the only purpose behind the law was animosity toward gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals, the law failed even the rational basis test. Id. at 634.
128. Faucon, supra note 54, at 499 (“The holding and language of Lawrence
also do much in overruling the negative implications of Reynolds on marriage and
alternative lifestyles in the constitutional jurisprudence.”).
129. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161, 1173 (1988).
130. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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Justice Kennedy spoke of the constitutional protection for all individuals in “the
most intimate and private aspects of their lives.”131 Justice Kennedy clarified
this distinction in how the right is framed when he explained that to define
narrowly the right in Lawrence as “simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean
a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have
sexual intercourse.”132 Although individuals in bigamous unions should not be
entitled to have their relationships recognized as a legal form of marriage,133
they should be allowed the right to define their relationships because “these
liberties extend to personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”134 Thus, if
confronted with the constitutionality of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute, the
Louisiana Supreme Court should apply a strict scrutiny analysis135 and hold that
the right to privacy under the Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right
to practice bigamy free of criminal liability.
2. The Level of Scrutiny for Denying Legal Recognition to Bigamous
Unions
The proper scrutiny standard for the issue of legalizing bigamous
unions is best determined through an analysis under both equal protection
and due process. This approach is necessary because of the convoluted
overlap between the two doctrines in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence136
and the uncertainty as to how this overlap affects the determination of the
proper standard of scrutiny for future rights, such as the legal practice of
bigamy.

131. Id. at 574.
132. Id. at 558.
133. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
134. William Duncan, Transforming the Right to Privacy, THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA 371, 382 (2015) (describing the “self-definition” conception of the right to
privacy).
135. Because Justice Kennedy failed to explain the level of scrutiny applied in
Lawrence, the Louisiana Supreme Court should provide explicitly that because
Louisiana’s bigamy statute infringes upon a fundamental right—the right to
privacy—strict scrutiny therefore must apply to its constitutional analysis of the
statute. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
136. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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a. Analysis Under Equal Protection
One potential legal avenue for recognizing bigamous unions as a right
warranting strict scrutiny is through an analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause.137 In this context, the legalization of bigamous marriage might occur
through an argument based on sexual orientation as a suspect classification,138
an idea recently implied but not expressly stated by the Supreme Court in
Windsor.139 The problem with this approach, however, is that sexual
orientation has not been designated as a suspect classification deserving of
strict scrutiny140 because, similar to the Court’s approach in the fundamental
rights arena, the Court is hesitant to define new classifications that warrant an
almost insurmountable standard for the government to defeat.141 If the Court
declined to define sexual orientation as a suspect classification, it is unlikely
that individuals in bigamous unions will be granted suspect classification
status either. The Court has not introduced a new suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause since it invalidated racially discriminatory legislation142
137. See Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1461, 1476 (2011).
138. Id. According to two scholars, some polygamists feel that “being
polyamorous is a fundamental part of their self-definition, regardless of their
relationship structure at any given time, to the extent that they report that efforts to
be monogamous feel unnatural to them.” Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at
313. It is certainly questionable, however, whether a court would consider polygamy
as a sexual orientation. See id. at 314; Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (explaining sexual-orientation discrimination as “discrimination
based on a person’s predisposition or inclination to be romantically or sexually
attracted to a certain type of person (i.e., heterosexuality, homosexuality,
bisexuality, or asexuality), or based on a person’s gender identity (i.e., a person’s
internal sense of gender)”).
139. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
140. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 699.
141. Id. The Court may be hesitant to define new suspect classifications
because of the potential danger in preventing the government from enforcing its
laws. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
142. In fact, the Court last addressed bigamy in its Reynolds opinion when it
upheld the constitutionality of laws banning bigamy, a decision that allegedly
contained racial motivations itself. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878) (“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations
of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law,
the second marriage was always void, and from the earliest history of England
polygamy has been treated as an offence against society.”); see also Faucon, supra
note 54, at 480.
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from the Civil Rights Era. Consequently, many scholars doubt whether the
Supreme Court will recognize another suspect class anytime soon.143
Nevertheless, Windsor is significant because it is one of the more recent
decisions by the Court to examine sexual orientation as a social classification.144
In Windsor, however, the Court neither specified which scrutiny it applied nor
addressed whether the law violated the fundamental right to marry.145 Thus,
Windsor’s effect on the debate regarding the constitutionality of bigamous
marriage is uncertain. Although Windsor’s effect on the bigamy question
remains unclear, the opinion’s ambiguous holding remains significant because
it suggests that the Court used a rational basis standard to hold the law
unconstitutional rather than explicitly defining sexual orientation as a class
warranting a heightened scrutiny standard.146 Because only a legitimate state
interest is needed to uphold a law under a rational basis standard of review,
Windsor’s holding suggests that bigamous marriages will gain legal recognition
only when the government lacks a legitimate interest for denying legal
recognition to the unions.
Although it was clear in Windsor that no legitimate interest existed for the
government to define marriage to exclude same-sex couples from the
fundamental right to marry, the government likely will be able to deny legal
recognition to bigamous unions if a rational basis standard is applied because
of the impact bigamous marriage would have on tax and community property
law.147 Though the decision in Windsor was significant in paving the way for
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, it does not do enough to change
the overall structural and systematic nature of marriage. In that regard,
“Windsor does not represent the sort of wholesale shift in how intimate adult
relationships are recognized under the law.”148 Because individuals in
bigamous unions have not been identified explicitly as a suspect class
warranting a strict scrutiny standard analysis by the Supreme Court, the
government should be required to meet only a rational basis standard in
denying these unions legal recognition.

143. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power
to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94
B.U. L. REV. 367, 385 (2014).
144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 821.
145. United States v. Windsor, 539 U.S. 2675, 2706 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”) (emphasis added).
147. Faucon, supra note 54, at 513–14; see also discussion infra Part. III.B.
148. Id. at 514.
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b. Analysis Under Due Process
Bigamy also could obtain legal recognition through a strict scrutiny
analysis in light of the fundamental right to privacy recognized in
Lawrence.149 Though Justice Kennedy used broad language in Lawrence’s
majority opinion in the sense that he declined to recognize a specific scrutiny
standard for his analysis,150 the holding nevertheless is insufficient for the
legal recognition of bigamy. The Lawrence decision focused on the right to
be free, or “left alone,” from governmental interference in one’s private and
intimate affairs.151 Although Lawrence certainly was concerned with the
liberty interests granted to individuals under due process, the opinion focused
more on an individual’s freedom from governmental intrusion152 as opposed
to an individual’s right of access to government institutions like marriage.153
This distinction, in the context of bigamous marriage, highlights the contrast
between “positive” and “negative” rights long recognized in constitutional
law.154 The concepts of “positive” and “negative” rights, explained by Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell, suggests that although individuals have the
right to be free from government intrusion in their private affairs,155 it does
not follow that this principle also requires the government to recognize
bigamy as a form of marriage.156 The holding in Lawrence is insufficiently
broad to grant the legal recognition of bigamous marriage because the
decision focused more on the fundamental right to privacy rather than the right
to marry.157
The notion that Lawrence is insufficient for the legalization of bigamous
unions may be weakened by an argument focused on the reasoning from both
Lawrence and Griswold. The concept of an individual’s “zone of privacy”
recognized in Griswold158 may be expansive enough to warrant the legal
recognition of bigamous marriage when paired with the broad affirmation of
the right to privacy in Lawrence. An argument, however, that the broad
privacy interests recognized in Griswold should warrant the legal recognition
149. See, e.g., id. at 497.
150. See supra note 122.
151. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 881.
152. Id. at 882.
153. Id.
154. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2271, 2283 (1990).
155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 577.
156. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2635 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Faucon, supra note 54, at 503.
158. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
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of bigamous marriage is insufficient because Griswold focused only on
the privacy interests attached to marriage rather than the idea of expanding
the legal scope of what marriage as an institution entails.159 Thus, for
bigamous marriage to warrant strict scrutiny analysis—which likely would
grant bigamy legal recognition160—such an outcome would need to result
from a judicial analysis under the broad liberty interests associated with
the right to marry.161 For a judicial analysis of bigamy under due process,
a strict scrutiny standard should apply only if the purported right to
bigamous marriage is determined to fall within the contours of the broader
fundamental right to marry.
The answer to the question of whether bigamous unions should be
granted legal recognition likely will turn on how the court frames the
purported right. For example, if the purported right is framed as a “right to
bigamous marriage,” it likely will fail the traditional fundamental rights
analysis because bigamous marriage is unlikely to be recognized as a
practice deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition.162 The analysis changes,
however, if the issue is framed as whether the right to marry more than
one person is “nothing but a subset of the more general right to marry.”163
The framing of the right at issue is central to the confusion regarding the
interplay between due process and equal protection, a problem further
exacerbated by Obergefell.
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell applied
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning from the majority opinion to raise the central
question of the bigamy debate: whether the reasons for why marriage is
crucial to society are equally applicable to individuals in bigamous unions,
just as they were for same-sex couples.164 Regarding Justice Kennedy’s
test in Obergefell,165 it is reasonable to conclude that its first principle, that
the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy, is equally applicable to individuals in bigamous
unions.166 No adequate reason exists to suggest that the personal choices
involved with marriage are any more meaningful for persons in monogamous
unions, or that individuals in bigamous unions cannot express the same
159. See, e.g., id.
160. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 567.
161. Faucon, supra note 54, at 516.
162. See Pollvogt, supra note 78.
163. Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 315.
164. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2622–23 (2015) (Roberts, C. J.,
dissenting).
165. Id. at 2599.
166. Id. at 2600.
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intimacy to their partners that individuals in monogamous unions share with
each other. The majority also justified its test by arguing that the right to marry
safeguards children and families167 and that marriage is a keystone of social
order.168 These reasons are difficult concepts to apply to bigamous marriage;
relevant data suggests that bigamous marriage in fact would be harmful to
both women and children,169 and legalizing bigamous marriage likely would
upset social order because of its potential to disrupt the majority of United
States marriage laws.170
The analysis under Justice Kennedy’s test becomes more problematic
with the additional principle set forth in Obergefell: Justice Kennedy argued
that the right to marry is fundamental because “it supports a two-person union
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”171 Although
this principle certainly applies to same-sex couples, proponents of bigamous
marriage likely will be unable to apply this same principle equally to
bigamous unions because of the obvious fact that they consist of more than
two individuals. Chief Justice Roberts, however, criticized the majority
opinion for this argument, suggesting that its reasoning could be extended
to plural marriage—despite, in his view, Justice Kennedy’s “random[]”
insertion of the phrase “two-person union.”172
Justice Kennedy should have conducted his analysis under the
traditional fundamental rights approach used by the Court in past decisions
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Court consistently
167. Id.; see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008) (“[P]romoting
and facilitating a stable environment for the protection and raising of children is
unquestionably one of the vitally important purposes underlying the institution of
marriage and the constitutional right to marry.”).
168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
169. See John Witte, Jr., Why Two in One Flesh? The Western Case for Monogamy
over Polygamy, 64 EMORY L.J. 1675, 1738 (2015); see also Aviram & Leachman, supra
note 10, at 316–17 (citing ELISABETH SHEFF, THE POLYAMORIST NEXT DOOR: INSIDE
MULTIPLE-PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILIES 135–63 (2015)); Ruth K. Khalsa,
Polygamy as a Red Herring in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 54 DUKE L.J. 1665,
1692 n.137 (2005) (noting the “third-party effects” of bigamous relationships on
women and children).
170. See discussion infra Part III.B; see also, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra
note 10, at 318 (noting the government’s interest in conserving the resources that
would be required by the extension of marital rights to plural unions, “since many
legal and administrative constructs in the United States rely on the structure of
marriage as involving two parties”).
171. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). In fact, nowhere in the opinion does
Justice Kennedy provide any explicit argument for his description of marriage as a
“two-person” union. Id.
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has held the right to marry as fundamental under the scope of this test,173
Justice Kennedy should have analyzed whether same-sex couples were
seeking access to this same right or a different right altogether. In Obergefell,
same-sex couples sought access to the same right enjoyed by heterosexual
couples; in other words, the fundamental right to marry applied to same-sex
couples in the same manner in which it applied to heterosexual couples
because they were “similarly situated” to the right to marry.174 This “similarly
situated” language speaks to the delicate tension and overlap between due
process and equal protection that the Court unfortunately failed to articulate
in Obergefell.175
In a companion case to Windsor, the district court’s majority opinion
alluded to the overlap between due process and equal protection when it held
that a law prohibiting same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under both the
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause.176 The majority’s analysis
argued that the defining characteristics of marriage do not involve the race,
gender, or sexual orientation of the individuals seeking to join in
marriage177—a concept previously supported by the Court in Loving.178
Instead, the court opined that marriage should be defined by the fidelity
displayed between the consenting and committed individuals joining together
in union;179 thus, the court concluded that a law banning same-sex marriage
could not be upheld because the right to marry applied equally to same-sex
couples as it did for opposite-sex couples.180 In contrast, plural relationships
173. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.”).
174. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; see also Pollvogt, supra note 78.
175. See discussion supra Part I.B.
176. See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and
rem. sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). The aforementioned
case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, involved a series of federal cases that invalidated a
California initiative that banned same-sex marriage. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at
2656. The district court’s ruling that had held the law unconstitutional was given
controlling effect when the Supreme Court, hearing on appeal in Hollingsworth,
declined to address the merits of the case due to a lack of standing. The district court’s
ruling, however, did not apply as controlling precedent for states other than California.
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2652.
177. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993–94.
178. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
179. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (“Plaintiffs seek to have the state recognize
their committed relationships, and plaintiffs’ relationships are consistent with the
core of the history, tradition and practice of marriage in the United States.”).
180. Id.
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inherently are defined by inequality.181 The promise of fidelity in
monogamous marriage encourages spouses to devote themselves to each
other unconditionally and entirely. The parties to a bigamous marriage,
however, may owe to each other different levels of commitment entirely,
especially if one of the parties to the union is married to only one individual
while the other party is married to several. Although Justice Kennedy’s analysis
in Obergefell was ambiguous and ignored the traditional fundamental rights
analysis of the Court, the ultimate conclusion reached was doctrinally sound. If
race no longer bars individuals from seeking to enjoy the right to marry after
Loving,182 then neither should sexual orientation.
Although Justice Kennedy hinted at these “core functions” of marriage in
his explanation of why the right to marry applied to same-sex couples,183 he did
so using an obscure and unprecedented analysis. Furthermore, he declined to
specify the scrutiny standard used and, instead, vaguely stated that the law at
issue violated both equal protection and due process,184 exacerbating the
confusion as to how courts should interpret new rights in future decisions.
Additionally, Justice Kennedy’s approach creates a dangerous precedent for
Supreme Court analysis. By ignoring the traditional fundamental rights
approach of prior Supreme Court decisions, justices of the Court create
possibilities for future justices to supply their own beliefs and morals instead
of a proper constitutional analysis. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court
should conclude that under the traditional fundamental rights approach, the
holding in Obergefell should not result in the recognition of bigamous
marriage as a fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny because
individuals in bigamous unions are not “similarly situated” to the right to
marry as are same-sex couples.185
B. Identifying a Justifiable Governmental Interest
This Comment next addresses whether a narrowly tailored governmental
interest exists for a state that declines to recognize bigamous unions as a legal
181. Ruth K. Khalsa, supra note 170, at 1692.
In light of the high value modern U.S. culture places on individual autonomy
and equality, the cornerstones of the companionate ideal of marriage, it is
unlikely that polygamy could be legalized under the same individualityfocused rationale of Lawrence or Goodridge because polygamy tends to be
premised on dependence, inequality, and even subordination.
Id.
182. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
183. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
184. See id. at 2616 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
185. Faucon, supra note 54, at 516.

362

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

form of marriage. The two major areas considered under this analysis are
the potential conflicts between the legalization of bigamous unions and the
areas of tax and community property law in the United States.186
1. The Conflict with Tax Law
Not only is United States tax law one of the most complex areas of
law within the American legal system,187 it is also a body of law that
largely has been ignored by scholars in the bigamous marriage debate.188
Specifically, much of the legal scholarship debating the constitutionality
of bigamous marriage overlooks the question of how this practice could
coexist legally with current American law, such as tax law, which treats
married and unmarried individuals differently in several respects.189
A significant distinction that tax law makes between married and
unmarried taxpayers is the difference in applied tax rates.190 For example,
married couples can file and pay their taxes as a unified or joint taxpayer
and thus have different rates applied to them than the rates that apply to
unmarried taxpayers.191 This distinction is important to the bigamous
marriage debate because “while the current tax rates could accommodate
same-sex couples without any substantive changes, applying the current tax
brackets to polygamous taxpayers would have absurd and often unjust
results.”192
The legalization of bigamous marriage would pose a unique and significant
challenge to American tax law that was not present in the constitutional debate
of same-sex marriage.193 In same-sex unions, the dyadic nature of “traditional”
186. See Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 318; see also, e.g., Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (“A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish
classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that
accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for
limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill.”).
187. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.; see also, e.g., Brunson, supra note 9, at
167 (“While there is no single ‘correct’ way to tax married persons, joint filing
appears to be unworkable in a world of expanded familial options.”) (footnote
omitted).
188. See supra note 108.
189. Id.
190. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., THE POTENTIAL FEDERAL TAX
IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR (STRIKING SECTION 3 OF THE DEFENSE
OF MARRIAGE ACT (DOMA)): SELECTED ISSUES 8 (2013).
191. See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 318.
192. Brunson, supra note 9, at 113.
193. See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 318.
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marriage is maintained because there is no quantitative distinction present.
Same-sex relationships, at least those similar to the relationships represented
in Obergefell, still are unions between two equally consenting individuals.194
The only difference between same-sex and heterosexual unions is the sexual
orientation of the partners involved. Bigamous unions, however, are
relationships that are without limit as to the number of individuals who can
form and participate in the relationship. This fact seriously complicates
American tax law because the tax filing system is designed to treat married
persons as an economic unit consisting of only two individuals.195
An additional problem with incorporating bigamous marriage into the
current tax law concerns the significant lack of predictability concerning
plural unions and the various forms they can take.196 One scholar illustrates
this problem when she explains that although asymmetric and group marriage
probably would cover a significant fraction of the actual arrangements people
might desire, they would not exhaust the possibilities.197 Although the idea of
creating a new tax system designed to apply a standard tax rate to marriages
consisting of more than two individuals may be possible theoretically,198 the
issue lies in designing a tax system capable of applying rates to marriages
varying wildly in both form and number.
Conceivably, any government can solve this problem by creating a tax
system to apply a standard rate to all bigamous marriages, no matter the
number of partners involved.199 The level of complexity with incorporating
bigamous unions into the current tax filing system, however, demands an
equally complex solution. Though providing an individualized tax system
tailored to each family would create the fairest system, “doing so would add
unnecessary complexity to the tax law and would be virtually unadministrable.”200 Even assuming that the government can create a tax filing
system that sufficiently addresses the problems that legal incorporation of
bigamous unions would present, “Congress would need to make significant,
complex changes to joint filing . . . [that] may be difficult, if not impossible,
to design and implement.”201 Because of the significant complexities with

194. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015).
195. See CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 190, at 9.
196. Davis, supra note 96, at 2007.
197. Klein, supra note 111, at 49.
198. See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 319.
199. See Brunson, supra note 9, at 117.
200. Id. at 129; see also, e.g., Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections
as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
21, 66 (2010).
201. Brunson, supra note 9, at 168.
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meeting such a high administrative burden, the government could provide
efficiency reasons for refusing to recognize polygamous marriages legally.202
2. The Conflict with Community Property Law
The granting of legal recognition to bigamous unions poses significant
conflicts for the process of terminating marriage, a problem that is highlighted
when analyzed within the context of community property law. Community
property states follow the rule that all assets and earnings acquired during the
existence of the marriage are owned equally by both spouses.203 This concept
raises complex questions concerning how bigamous marriages could coexist
legally in a state that recognizes community property law, such as Louisiana.
The assumption in the majority of community property states is to divide
the assets equally upon dissolution of the marriage,204 but this process would
become “drastically complicated in polygamous marriages, especially when
one wife may leave the family unit behind or when the husband dies, leaving
all of his wives to ‘split’ the pie.”205 The legalization of bigamous marriage
would raise serious concerns in regards to the termination stage of marriage
because whether by death or divorce, all marriages terminate at some point and
the law must have an appropriate mechanism to address this end.206 The
conundrum of how community property law would be able to partition property
in bigamous marriages is problematic because “it is not at all obvious how best
to understand, classify, and divide the community property of a person with
more than one spouse at a time, as must be done at death or divorce.”207
Similar to the potential conflict between bigamous marriage and current tax
law, the widely varying forms of bigamous unions also pose a concern for
community property states.208 For example, community property law could
202. The Court in the past generally has disfavored the excuse of administrative
burdens when making decisions regarding constitutional rights, but only when the
right in question has warranted a strict scrutiny analysis. See Police Dep’t of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 & n.9 (1972) (holding that for fundamental rights, mere
“administrative convenience” is not a compelling interest).
203. Klein, supra note 111, at 33.
204. Community property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Specifically, these assets include property that is acquired during the marriage by
means other than an inheritance, devise, or gift, with each spouse generally holding a
one-half interest in the property. Id.
205. Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America,
22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2014).
206. Davis, supra note 96, at 1990.
207. Klein, supra note 111, at 39.
208. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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incorporate bigamous unions that consist only of separate, two-person unions
because, although all the partners may live together in one household, they
nevertheless are married legally to only one other individual. This fact
changes, however, in a bigamous union that desires to be recognized as one
family or “community.”209 A simple solution to this potential issue would be
to require all individuals in bigamous marriages to form their families as a
series of two-person couples. This solution is insufficient, however, because
some bigamous families may consist of an odd number of individuals.
Additionally, it seems unjust to have a law mandating how bigamous families
should form their relationships because “the decision to add a spouse
implicates an individual’s freedom of intimate association.”210
IV. PROPOSING A DOCTRINAL SOLUTION
Because of the recent confusion regarding due process and equal
protection, courts no longer have a clear standard to follow when determining
whether a new fundamental right exists. The Louisiana Supreme Court, if
presented with the issue of bigamous marriage, should confront the tension
between equal protection and due process under both the Louisiana and
United States constitutions to guide the state legislature in its enactment of
future laws regarding bigamy and to influence the legal opinions concerning
this issue on a larger scale.
In terms of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute,211 the Louisiana
Supreme Court should rule unconstitutional the law that criminalizes
bigamous unions because of the right to privacy recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Lawrence.212 Although Lawrence might be an insufficient
basis for this proposition because its holding only concerned laws prohibiting
homosexual sodomy,213 the Louisiana Supreme Court nevertheless should rule
the criminal aspect of the statute unconstitutional given the heightened standard
of privacy mandated by the Louisiana constitution.214 This facet of
209. Klein, supra note 111, at 42.
210. Id. at 53.
211. See discussion supra Part II.B.
212. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
213. Id.
214. LA CONST. art. I, § 5; see also S. Con. Res. 39, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La.
1997). Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has never determined the exact
parameters of the state’s constitutional right to privacy in the sexual arena, see e.g.,
State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501, 518 (La. 2000) (Calogero, J., dissenting), the court has
recognized it as an express right providing a higher standard of individual liberty than
that afforded by the federal constitution. See State v. Baxley, 633 So. 2d 142, 145 (La.
1994).
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Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute should be ruled unconstitutional on the
same grounds as the statute at issue in Lawrence: the statute invades an area
of constitutionally-protected privacy by prohibiting consensual, private, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy.215
Laws criminalizing the practice of bigamy also should be struck down
because they do not exist to protect against coercion, injury, or public harm.216
Opponents of bigamy have argued that this practice is harmful and abusive to
women, often referencing the history of this practice in Muslim countries to
bolster their argument.217 Numerous other studies, however, reveal that
although these concerns are valid, little evidence exists to show that these
same concerns are equally present in the United States.218 Moreover, even
though there always exists a concern that abuse will occur in traditional
monogamous relationships, it does not follow that this potential harm justifies
governmental interference.219 As long as valid consent exists between
individuals in bigamous unions, the individuals in those unions should be able
to define their relationship in whatever manner they choose without fear of
criminal punishment. The criminal nature of Louisiana’s bigamy statute
cannot be justified because the legislation lacks a compelling interest to justify
its effect of intruding upon private and intimate activity between consenting
individuals. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court should invalidate the
criminal aspect of the bigamy statute as unconstitutional for failing to pass
strict scrutiny.
A potential obstacle to this approach, however, is whether the Louisiana
Legislature actually will remove the criminal aspect of its bigamy statute even
if the Louisiana Supreme Court were to rule it unconstitutional. Despite the
ruling in Obergefell, statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage in Louisiana have
yet to be repealed.220 Although the Louisiana Supreme Court lacks the ability
to legislatively modify the bigamy statute, it does have the power to strike part
of the law down as unconstitutional under the Louisiana Constitution. By
removing the criminal aspect of the Louisiana bigamy statute the Louisiana
215. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
216. See id. at 579.
217. See Witte, Jr., supra note 169, at 1691.
218. See Faucon, supra note 54, at 488.
219. Sanford Levinson, Thinking about Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1049,
1052 (2005).
220. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2017). In addition to the existence of these
unconstitutional laws, there have been previous instances in which Louisiana law
enforcement has still enforced them. See supra note 96; see also Michelle Garcia,
Louisiana: Men Arrested Under Unconstitutional Sodomy Law, ADVOCATE (Feb. 22,
2015), https://www.advocate.com/crime/2015/02/22/louisiana-men-arrested-underunconstitutional-sodomy-law [https://perma.cc/GNU6-RSQ4].
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Supreme Court can create the necessary pressure to “force the hand” of the
legislature to reform the statute. Moreover, even if the legislature declines to
reform the statute, a ruling invalidating the criminal aspect of the statute will
allow individuals in bigamous unions the protection they need to sue the
government if criminal charges were brought against them.
After striking down the criminal aspect of Louisiana’s bigamy statute, the
Louisiana Supreme Court next should confront whether bigamous unions
should be granted legal recognition. Because the statute raises two separate
questions, the court can apply a different level of scrutiny to this second
issue.221 Thus, after striking down the criminal aspect of the bigamy statute,
the Louisiana Supreme Court should decline to legally recognize the practice
of bigamous unions under a rational basis analysis.
In its analysis of “framing”222 the purported right at issue, the court
should analyze whether the practice of bigamy falls under the constitutionally
recognized right to marry while relying on United States Supreme Court
precedent.223 Although Justice Kennedy’s language in Obergefell describing
the right to marry as a “two-person union”224 suggests that the Louisiana
Supreme Court justifiably can decline legal recognition to bigamous unions
on this basis alone, the court nevertheless should focus on the traditional
fundamental rights test to reach this conclusion. By doing so, the Louisiana
Supreme Court can reach a conclusive result while simultaneously adhering
to United States Supreme Court precedent—an approach that Justice Kennedy
unfortunately declined to follow in Obergefell.225
Through the traditional fundamental rights approach, the Louisiana
Supreme Court should articulate that, unlike same-sex couples, individuals in
bigamous unions seek a right different from the right to marry previously
recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental to the nation’s history and
tradition.226 Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court should determine that under
a rational basis standard, the potential destabilizing effect that the legalization
of bigamous unions would have on Louisiana’s governmental institutions—
especially Louisiana’s tax-filing administration and community property
regime—is a legitimate interest in denying these unions legal recognition. In
221. Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the (Heightened,
Intermediate, or Strict) Scrutiny Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and
Powers Are Created Equal, 10 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 421, 442–44, 443 nn.106–07
(2009).
222. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
223. See discussion supra Part I.B.
224. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
225. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
226. See discussion supra Part III.A.2; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24,
at 829.
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this way, the court can provide a solution to both of the central issues raised
by the statute. By denying legal recognition to bigamous unions, the court will
safeguard the protection of Louisiana’s governmental institutions and
preserve the state’s ability to regulate marriage. Additionally, the court will
ensure that consenting individuals in bigamous unions will be able to define
their relationships in the manner they desire without the fear of the state
violating their privacy through criminal punishment.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional question of legalizing bigamous unions is a significant
and complex issue that likely will require an equally complex solution.
Although the overlap between due process and equal protection has become
increasingly ambiguous and difficult to apply in the realm of individual rights,
the tension between these two doctrines highlights the need for a court to
provide clarity to this muddled area of precedent. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, if confronted with these issues, should analyze the question of
bigamous marriage through the traditional fundamental rights framework
previously applied by the United States Supreme Court. By taking the
initiative in addressing the question of bigamous marriage, the Louisiana
Supreme Court can not only properly define the parameters of the state’s
ability to regulate its most important governmental institutions but also can
safeguard the privacy rights of its citizens.

McLaurine H. Zentner

 J.D./D.C.L., 2018, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
The author would like to thank Professors Elizabeth Carter and Paul Baier for their
invaluable guidance and knowledge during the development of this Comment. The
author also extends special thanks to his parents, Scott and Maggie; his grandmother,
Jean; and his sister, Margaret Ann, for their love, support, and patience. Lastly, this
work is dedicated to the loving memory of the author’s late grandparents, Tom
Zentner and Rev. William Hall; their brilliance inspires his intellectual pursuits.

